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Abstract
Evaluating the possible benefits of the introduction of genetically modified (GM)
crops must address the issue of consumer resistance as well as the complex regulation
that has ensued. In the European Union (EU) this regulation envisions the “co-existence” 
of GM food with conventional and quality-enhanced products, mandates the labelling and
traceability of GM products, and allows only a stringent adventitious presence of GM
content in other products. All these elements are brought together within a partial
equilibrium model of the EU agricultural food sector. The model comprises conventional,
GM and organic food. Demand is modelled in a novel fashion, whereby organic and
conventional products are treated as horizontally differentiated but GM products are
vertically differentiated (weakly inferior) relative to conventional ones. Supply accounts
explicitly for the land constraint at the sector level and for the need for additional
resources to produce organic food. Model calibration and simulation allow insights into
the qualitative and quantitative effects of the large-scale introduction of GM products in
the EU market. We find that the introduction of GM food reduces overall EU welfare,
mostly because of the associated need for costly segregation of non-GM products, but the
producers of quality-enhanced products actually benefit.
Keywords: biotechnology, differentiated demand, genetically modified crops, identity
preservation, innovation, welfare.
11. Introduction
The advent of biotechnology in agriculture has resulted in momentous (and ongoing) adjustments
in the agricultural and food sector. Over the course of only a few years, a large portion of the area
cultivated to some basic commodities has been converted to planting of genetically modified
(GM) crops. James (2005) reports that global planting of GM crops reached 200 million acres in
2004, virtually all of which comprised four commodities: corn, soybeans, cotton, and canola
(oilseed rape). The hallmark of these GM crops, relative to those deriving from prior breeding
programs, is an exciting novel scientific approach: insertion of foreign genetic material that
confers a specific attribute of great interest (such as herbicide or pest resistance). Somewhat
paradoxically, the novelty of GM crops explains both the enthusiastic support of their proponents
and the widespread consumer and public opposition that has hampered adoption in a number of
countries. Indeed, GM crop adoption has been confined to a limited number of countries (the
United States, Argentina, Brazil, Canada, and China accounted for 96% of total GM crop
cultivation in 2004). Elsewhere, GM crop adoption has been slowed or hampered by novel
regulation, apparently in response to the aforementioned vigorous public opposition (Sheldon,
2002).
Whereas some earlier studies have documented sizeable efficiency gains attributable to new GM
crops (Moschini, Lapan, and Sobolevsky, 2000; Falck-Zepeda, Traxler, and Nelson, 2000), it has
become clear that a major feature of this new technology deserves more careful scrutiny.
Specifically, a portion of consumers perceives food made from GM products as weakly inferior in
quality relative to traditional food. But the mere introduction of GM crops means that, to deliver
traditional GM-free food, additional costs must be incurred (relative to the pre-innovation
situation). This is because the commodity-based production, marketing, and processing system,
long relied upon by the food industry, is not suited to avoid the commingling of GM and non-GM
crops. To satisfy the demand for non-GM food, costly identity preservation (IP) and segregation
activities are required. Thus, the innovation process has, in this context, brought about a new
market failure, essentially an externality on the production of traditional food products (Lapan
and Moschini, 2004; Fulton and Giannakas, 2004).
The public concern about GM products has affected the regulatory process in the European Union
(EU), yielding a sweeping new framework that became operative in April 2004. The new system
is meant to foster food safety, protect the environment, and ensure consumers’ “right to know,” 
and it is centred on the notions of labelling and traceability (European Union, 2004). Specifically,
2the new EU regulations require that food and feed consisting of, or produced from, GM crops be
clearly labelled as such and envision a system that guarantees full traceability of GM food (and
feed) products put on the marketplace.1 Mandatory labelling is to apply to food and feed produced
from GM crops, including food from GM products even when it does not contain protein or DNA
from the GM crop (e.g., beet sugar). The threshold for avoiding the GM label is quite stringent:
only a 0.9% adventitious presence of (authorized) GM products in food is tolerated for a product
marketed without a GM label.
Perhaps in recognition of the interdependence and externalities characterizing GM crop adoption,
the EU is developing measures aimed at the “co-existence” of GM and non-GM agriculture
(Commission of the European Communities, 2003). The following extensive quote clarifies the
EU position on this matter (European Union, 2003):
“The issue of co-existence refers to the ability of farmers to provide consumers with a choice
between conventional, organic and GM products that comply with European labelling and purity
standards. Co-existence is not about environmental or health risks because only GM crops that
have been authorized as safe for the environment and for human health can be cultivated in the
EU. … Co-existence is concerned with the potential economic loss through the admixture of GM
and non-GM crops which could lower their value, with identifying workable management
measures to minimize admixture and with the cost of these measures.”
Thus, the unintended economic implications of the introduction of GM crops are very much at the
forefront here and motivate our study. Whereas the EU proposal contains detailed suggestions on
measures deemed necessary to ensure co-existence, the scale of the economic problem at hand
has not, to date, been analyzed in a coherent economic model. Indeed, current models of the
economic impacts of GM product adoption have either assumed that GM and non-GM products
are equivalent (Moschini, Lapan, and Sobolevsky, 2000; Falck-Zepeda, Traxler, and Nelson,
2000; Demont and Tollens, 2004) or that there are two qualitatively different products—one GM
and one non-GM—such that non-GM products are treated as one type of good (Desquilbet and
Bullock, 2001; Fulton and Giannakas, 2004; Lapan and Moschini, 2004).
1 As pointed out by a reviewer, traceability in the EU is actually being envisioned for all food and feed,
whether or not of GM origin, pursuant to Regulation EC 178/2002.
3The latter approach does reveal some important insights into the economics of GM crop adoption,
including the finding that the GM innovation, in the end, may not improve welfare (Moschini and
Lapan, 2005). But existing models are not refined enough to assess the differential impact that
GM adoption may have when pre-existing products are already differentiated. In particular, the
co-existence issue explicitly indicates the need to allow for three distinct products (conventional,
organic, and GM). Furthermore, while it has been shown that the welfare impact of GM
innovation is ambiguous, it is of interest to understand what market conditions lead to negative as
opposed to positive welfare effects. In the context of a larger model that accommodates the three
types of products singled out by the co-existence issue, such welfare effects are likely to depend
on the interdependence between markets. More specific attention to such multi-market effects is
warranted.2
In this article we develop a modelling framework that extends previous work by considering the
introduction of GM products in a system where two differentiated products already exist:
“conventional” food and “quality-enhanced” food. In the empirical part of the paper, the later is 
identified with “organic” food. The notion of organic food refers to the products of regulated 
production processes that essentially forego the use of a range of chemical inputs (fertilizers,
herbicides, and pesticides) that are widely used in conventional agriculture. What specifically can
be caled “organic” is a mater of national regulation, and the EU has its own rules and standards.3
In the EU, organic production accounts for about 3% of the utilized agricultural area (UAA). But
the EU recognizes that a large number of other food products can claim superior quality
attributes. The identification of these products in the marketplace is promoted by EU regulations
that established special labels known as PDO (Protected Designation of Origin), PGI (Protected
Geographical Indication), and TSG (Traditional Speciality Guaranteed).4 Thus, although our
model, strictly speaking, identifies the pre-GM differentiated food with organic food, we hope
that the results that we derive can be interpreted more generally to pertain to the broader set of
quality products that Europeans claim as a distinguishing feature of their agriculture (Fishler,
2002).
2 As noted by a reviewer, a study that models GM adoption with organic and conventional products in a
vertically differentiated products context is Giannakas and Yiannaka (2003).
3 See the EU web page on organic agriculture: http://europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/qual/organic/.
4 At present there are more than 600 food products in the EU that can claim such quality labels, although
their importance in terms of market share (and ultimately in terms of land used) is not known. See the
EU web page on quality policy at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/foodqual/quali1_en.htm.
4A first contribution of the paper is to derive a model of differentiated food demand that is
consistent with the stylized attribute of the problem at hand. Specifically, we derive a demand
system that admits three food products: conventional food, organic food, and GM food (in
addition to a numéraire, which can be thought of as an aggregate of all other goods). In our
demand framework, organic and conventional food products are horizontally differentiated
whereas GM and non-GM food products are vertically differentiated. Specifically, the GM good
is a weakly inferior substitute for the conventional food, and the model is specified in such a
fashion that all of the relevant parameters can be identified from observation of the pre-
innovation equilibrium. The supply side similarly accounts explicitly for the production of two
and three products (before and after the GM innovation, respectively). The quality enhancement
of organic production is modelled as deriving from additional efforts supplied by producers.
Equilibrium conditions account explicitly for the IP costs that are necessary after the introduction
of GM products, and endogenise the price of land and the reward to the additional efforts
supplied by farmers. The model is calibrated to replicate observed data of EU agriculture, based
on assumed values of some parameters. The solution of the model—for baseline parameter values
as well as other alternatives—allows us to determine the qualitative and quantitative economic
impacts of the possible large-scale adoption of GM crops in the EU.
2. Modelling strategy
The post-innovation situation is qualitatively different in that it is affected by a type of externality
(technically a nonconvexity), namely, the need for segregation of the pre-existing products.
Because of that, analytical welfare results are bound to be inconclusive—an increase and a
decrease in aggregate welfare are both possible. To proceed, we propose an explicit specification
of demand and supply relations to capture some stylized facts of GM product innovation. Next we
calibrate the model such that the chosen parameters are consistent with generally accepted
attributes of the agricultural sector and can replicate exactly the benchmark data set. By solving
the model thus calibrated under various assumptions, we can then shed some light on both the
qualitative and quantitative potential effects of large-scale GM product adoption on European
agriculture.
A major issue in the GM policy debate concerns consumers’ atitudes toward these new products 
(Boccaletti and Moro, 2000). In representing the demand side of the market, therefore, we allow
for the fact that the three food products are perceived as differentiated by consumers. But we also
want to capture some stylized facts about consumer preferences with respect to these goods.
5Specifically, conventional food is deemed no worse than GM food—in the definition of Lapan
and Moschini (2004), GM food is a “weakly inferior” substitute for conventional food. It seems 
that individual preferences are also quite heterogeneous with respect to our other product, organic
food. Whereas some consumers have a strong preference for organic food, often based on
perceived health, environmental, and animal-welfare considerations, other consumers may,
ceteris paribus, prefer conventional food based on other quality attributes (such as appearance,
integrity, and taste). Thus, in particular, the assumption that conventional food is weakly inferior
to organic food would seem untenable. Hence, we develop a demand framework whereby organic
and conventional food products are “horizontaly differentiated” whereas GM and non-GM food
products are “verticaly differentiated.” We submit that this novel approach, detailed in the 
section to follow, captures in an effective way the main attributes of demand in our context.
As for the supply side, an essential facet of the co-existence issue relates to the adjustments in
production brought about by the innovation adoption, in particular with regard to the welfare of
farmers. Concerning the latter, in a purely competitive sector such as agriculture, returns to
producers must be associated with the presence of some fixed factors of production. Land being
the obvious such fixed factor, in our model we represent the entire agricultural sector and assume
that a given endowment of land can be used to produce two outputs before GM innovation
(conventional and organic products) and three outputs after GM innovation (conventional,
organic, and GM products). Furthermore, it is apparent that organic products command a sizeable
price premium over conventional ones, while organic production accounts for only a small share
of overall production. The modelling avenue that we postulate to account for such stylized facts is
that organic production requires an additional input in the form of farmer-supplied effort, and that
this required extra labour input has an upward-sloping supply. This is certainly consistent with
the observation that organic production is typically more labour intensive, with customized labour
tasks substituting for inadmissible chemical inputs. Because this modelling strategy effectively
suffices in discriminating conventional and organic production, we then proceed by assuming that
land quality is homogeneous.5
5 A reviewer questioned the descriptive relevance of this assumption for the EU. While that concern is
legitimate, we can defend our modeling assumption as an abstraction that implements the existence of
the (undeniable) land constraint at the sector level and, when coupled with the additional effort
requirement for organic production, provides an effective representation of the different supply
responses of conventional and organic production. An alternative modeling strategy, which we
considered but did not adopt, would be to postulate that land is heterogeneous, i.e., each unit of land has
different suitability (i.e., yields) for the three possible outputs.
6Moving to equilibrium considerations, it is critical in this setting to represent the novel impacts of
GM product introduction in the marketplace. This requires an explicit consideration of the costs
of IP activities that are required, after innovation adoption, to supply non-GM products to the
consumers who want them. Furthermore, here we distinguish between the cost of IP itself with
the additional burden that may be imposed by specific product labelling rules. Whereas food
labelling in general serves the ultimate purpose of conveying useful information to consumers
(Golan et al., 2000), mandating that the inferior product carry the GM label, as required by the
recently approved EU rules, appears to do little in that regard. In particular, requiring GM
products to identify themselves through a label does not alleviate the cost of IP (to be borne by
non-GM suppliers) that is necessary to provide consumers with (credible) non-GM food. Put
another way, from an information economics point of view it is the superior (i.e., non-GM)
product that should carry the label. Thus, in our model we distinguish between the effects of IP
(of the superior products) and the impact of labelling and traceability requirements (on the
inferior product).6
3. The model
Based on the foregoing, the demand, supply and equilibrium conditions of an agricultural and
food sector before and after GM innovation are specified as follows.
3.1. Demand
Because it is widely accepted that such features of food demand arise from a collection of
consumers that manifest widely differing attitudes towards organic and GM food, it is useful to
derive aggregate demand explicitly from the specification of individual consumer preferences. To
implement the notion of weakly inferior substitutes, we extend the vertical product differentiation
model with unit demand of Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Tirole (1988, chapter 7). In that setting,
one postulates a population of consumers with heterogeneous preferences concerning two goods
(in addition to the numéraire) but in which all consumers agree that one good is no worse than the
other, ceteris paribus. We generalize that framework by allowing one additional good, such that
the individual agent utility function is defined over four goods: conventional food nq , organic
6 A final consideration worth noting is that the model we develop and solve is calibrated at the farm-gate
level. Accordingly, the demand functions that we consider must be interpreted as derived demands. In
addition to reflecting the nature of final EU consumer demand, such derived demands implicitly account
for the (net) excess demand for EU products originating from the export market. Thus, although the model
formally represents a closed economy sector, it is in fact consistent with an open economy setting.
7food bq , GM food gq , and a composite good y (the numéraire).
7 Furthermore, consumers here
are not restricted to buying one unit of the product but decide how much to purchase (in addition
to which good to purchase). As in the standard vertical product differentiation model, preferences
are assumed to be quasi-linear, such that the individual consumer’s utility function is writen with 
the following structure:
   , , , ( ),b n g n g bU y q q q y u q q q    (1)
where the function (.)u is assumed to be concave, and is an individual parameter that
characterizes the heterogeneity of consumers vis-à-vis their preference for GM food relative to
conventional food.
Note that, absent GM food, the utility function (apart from the numéraire) reduces to ( , )n bu q q .
Thus, conventional and organic foods are treated as imperfect substitutes but with no presumption
that one is uniformly better than the other for all consumers. On the other hand, to capture the fact
that GM food is assumed to be a weakly inferior substitute for the conventional food, we assume
that the distribution of the corresponding parameter satisfies [0,1] . In the foregoing
specification, each individual consumer will consume two goods: either organic and
conventional, or organic and GM, although the heterogeneity of consumers implies that, in
aggregate, all three food types may be consumed.8
More specifically, the consumer will buy the GM good if and only if g np p , whereas he or
she would buy the conventional food if g np p .9 So, let n gQ q q  and let
 ,Q n gp p p  denote the price of Q that applies (depending on whether nq or gq is
consumed). Now consider the problem of choosing Q and bq with the utility function rewritten
7 The subscript n stands for normal, the subscript b stands for biological, and the subscript g stands for
genetically modified product.
8 We assume that ( )u q is such that the consumer will buy some amount of one of the goods, and that
income is sufficiently high so that an interior solution holds.
9 The consumer is actually indifferent between the two varieties if the equality holds, but the technical
(and, in equilibrium, inconsequential) assumption here is that, under equality, the conventional food is
purchased.
8as ( , )bU y u Q q  . Then the optimality conditions for an interior solution are ( , )Q b Qu Q q p
and ( , )
bq b bu Q q p , which yield the individual demand functions ( , )Q Q bd p p and ( , )b Q bd p p .
As for the choice between nq and gq , as discussed earlier, that will depend on how the price
ratio g np p relates to . Individuals with g np p will prefer the conventional product and
thus buy
( , )n Q n bq d p p , ( , )b b n bq d p p , and 0gq  (2)
Individuals with g np p will prefer the GM product and buy
1
( , )g Q g bq d p p
 , ( , )b b g bq d p p , and 0nq  (3)
Market demand functions are obtained by integrating over all types. Thus,
 
0
, , ( , ) ( )
g np p
n n g b Q n bD p p p d p p dF   (4)
   
1 1
, , , ( )
g n
g n g b Q g b
p p
D p p p d p p dF 

  (5)
   
1
0
, , ( , ) ( ) , ( )
g n
g n
p p
b n g b b n b b g b
p p
D p p p d p p dF d p p dF     (6)
where ( )F  denotes the distribution function of consumer types.
To find explicit demand functions we rely on a simple parameterization that generalizes the
constant-elasticity demand framework. Specifically, the utility function is written as
9  
11
1, ( )
1b b
u Q q k Q q

  



       
(7)
where the parameter (0,1) controls the share between conventional and organic food, the
parameter  0 1   controls the overall food demand elasticity, and the parameter 0k 
controls the size of the market. Given this utility function, it is easily verified that the individual
demand functions display constant elasticity, specifically,
   1 (1 ) (1 )(1 )1 (1 ) (1 )(1 )( , ) ( ) (1 )Q Q b Q bd p p k p p                  (8)
   (1 ) (1 )1 (1 ) (1 )(1 )( , ) ( ) (1 )b Q b Q bd p p k p p                 (9)
Finally, we need to make assumptions about the distribution of consumer types (i.e., the
parameter ). To this end, we wish to allow for a fraction of consumers to be indifferent between
conventional and GM products. Given the choice, such consumers would simply buy the less
costly of the two goods.10 Thus, we specify a mixed distribution function ( )F  such that for a
fraction (0,1) of consumers the type is 1 , whereas for the remaining consumers the type
is uniformly distributed on [0,1) .11 Hence, the density ( ) ( )f F  on [0,1) is ( ) 1f    .
Given this and the individual demands in equations (8)-(9), evaluating the integrals in equations
(4)-(6), for the case n gp p , we obtain
 , , ( , )(1 ) gn n g b Q n b
n
p
D p p p d p p
p
    
 
(10)
10 Indeed, a good share of agricultural production is used as animal feed and, as noted by Brookes (2004),
such a demand is likely indifferent as to whether the feed is GM or not.
11 The parameter  may also capture stylized facts about consumers’ handling of label information 
(Noussair, Robin, and Ruffieux, 2002). One could also postulate the existence of a fraction of consumers
for which 0 . But imperfect information uptake from labels would spread this group, justifying the
continuous distribution that we have postulated on [0,1) .
10
     , , , ,g n g b Q g b n gD p p p d p p A p p    (11)
     , , , (1 ) , (1 ) ( , )gb n g b b n b b g b n g
n
p
D p p p d p p d p p A p p
p
             
(12)
where ( , )Q bd p and ( , )b bd p are given by (8) and (9), and
   
 1 (1 )
(1 )
, 1
1 (1 )
g
n g
n
p
A p p
p
 
 
            
(13)
For the case n gp p , as noted earlier, ( , , ) 0g b n gD p p p  . Such a case describes the situation
prior to the introduction of GM food, where 0gD  and the demands for conventional and
organic food reduce to
 , , ( , )n n g b Q n bD p p p d p p (14)
 , , ( , )b n g b b n bD p p p d p p (15)
where, again, the functions ( , )Q bd p and ( , )b bd p are as defined in (8) and (9). Note that the
demand structure for the new product is described in terms of the same underlying preference
parameters ( , , and )k   , a feature that is particularly convenient at the calibration and
simulation stage.
3.2. Production and supply
To capture the essential elements of the co-existence issue for the supply side, as discussed
earlier, we model the entire agricultural sector and assume that there is a given endowment of
land that can be used to produce two outputs before GM innovation (conventional and organic
products) and three outputs after GM innovation (conventional, organic, and GM products). To
keep things as simple and transparent as possible for the purpose of calibration, and yet obtain
non-trivial outcomes at the policy analysis stage, we assume constant returns to scale (at the
industry level) for both conventional and GM production. Specifically, if nx denotes production
11
of conventional food,  is the unit rental price of land, and w is the vector of prices of the
intermediate inputs used in food production, the cost function can be written as
( , , ) ( )n nn n nC x w x c w     (16)
where n is a parameter that can be interpreted as the reciprocal of yield, and ( )nc w is an
increasing, linearly homogeneous, and concave function of prices. Note that this cost function is
dual to a production function with a fixed proportion between land and a function of the bundle of
market inputs (unrestricted substitutability between market inputs is thus allowed).
Production of organic food, on the other hand, is assumed to require three types of inputs: land,
market-supplied inputs, and farmer-supplied effort. Again we assume fixed proportions between
land, a function of the bundle of market supply inputs, and farmer-supplied effort measured in
some efficiency units. But for the latter we assume that the cost of drawing the required farmer-
supplied efforts into organic production are increasing at the margin. For instance, one can
imagine a population of potential organic farmers, each with its own reservation price to enter this
particular industry (the heterogeneity displaying different abilities for supplying the effort
required in organic food production). If bx denotes the production of organic food, the
corresponding cost function is written as
( , , ) ( , )b bb b bC x w x c w z     (17)
where b is the parameter representing the reciprocal of yield, z is a variable that indexes
farmer-supplied inputs used in organic food production, and ( , )bc w z is increasing, linearly
homogeneous, and concave in w , and increasing in z (more on this to follow).
We measure conventional food and organic food in the same units. Typically, the presumption is
that production per unit of land (i.e., yield) is lower in organic food production, which would
imply b n  . Furthermore, we assume that the price vector w of the intermediate inputs is
given, and thus we subsume its effect in the unit sub-costs. Specifically, for the conventional
product we write ( )nc w c such that (for given  and w ) conventional food production is a
12
constant marginal cost industry. Organic production, on the other hand, is assumed to be an
increasing cost industry: at the margin, expanding organic production requires additional farmer-
supplied inputs that are available only at increasing cost. To capture that, and still take all market
prices as given, we write ( , ) (1 )bc w z z c  , where 0 is a parameter to be determined at
the calibration stage. More specifically, we normalize  0,1z (without loss of generality,
because units are arbitrary) so that we can interpret z as the fraction of land that is allocated to
organic production. Given this, before the advent of GM products the marginal costs of
production are written as, respectively, n nMC c   and (1 )b bMC z c    .
Post innovation, GM food production gx becomes feasible. Given the standard effects of first-
generation GM agricultural products, we assume that the main attribute of GM crops is to provide
higher production efficiency at the farm level. We model that by postulating that the GM
technology cuts the cost of the bundle of market-supplied inputs,12 such that the unit cost of
market-supplied inputs for GM crop production is c , where 0 1  . But GM products also
impose the need for IP, which we model by postulating a unit segregation cost ns on the
production of conventional food, and a unit segregation cost bs on the production of organic
food.13 The parameter bs will also capture the policies of organic food classification by means of
the presence of a trace amount of GM food.14 Furthermore, GM regulation may mandate an
additional unit cost t for the producers of GM food (i.e., the mandatory labelling and traceability
requirements envisioned by the EU). Thus, the introduction of GM products affects the
production costs of all three food products, and the post-innovation marginal production costs are
represented by
12 Note that this formulation is quite consistent with the existence of market power in the pricing of GM
seeds, as in existing related models (e.g., Moschini and Lapan, 1997; Lapan and Moschini, 2004; Fulton
and Giannakas, 2004), as long as innovators do not extract the entire efficiency gain, i.e., there is some
spillover to farmers of the gross benefits (as found by Moschini, Lapan, and Sobolevsky, 2000 and
Falck-Zepeda, Traxler, and Nelson, 2000). In other words, the cost reduction represented by the
parameter  is to be interpreted as capturing the underlying efficiency gain in production, due to the
innovation, net of the possibly noncompetitive pricing of the improved inputs. But for the rest of the
marketing sector we postulate a competitive setting.
13 A constant unit segregation cost is a simplification that is invoked to keep the solution tractable. More
realistically, as pointed out by a reviewer, one could postulate variable unit segregation costs that reflect
the existence of fixed costs in the segregation process, as well as the possibility of decreasing returns to
scale (on some domain) due to congestion in the marketing channels.
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n n nMC c s   (18)
(1 )b b bMC z c s     (19)
g nMC c t    (20)
3.3. Equilibrium
Based on the foregoing, and given a fixed amount of land L , the (partial) competitive equilibrium
in the agricultural sector after the GM innovation (assuming that all three products are produced)
can be written as
* *
n n np c s   (21)
* * *(1 )b b bp z c s     (22)
* *
g np c t    (23)
* * * *( , , )b b n g bD p p p x (24)
* * * *( , , )n b n g nD p p p x (25)
* * * *( , , )g b n g gD p p p x (26)
* *
b bz L x (27)
* * *
b b n n n gL x x x     (28)
Equations (21)-(23) represent the competitive production conditions (marginal cost equals price)
for the three outputs of the sector, where marginal cost accounts for the (endogenous) rent on land
and the existence of segregation costs. Equations (24)-(26) represent clearing conditions (equality
between demand and supply) in the three food markets. Equation (28) accounts for equilibrium in
the land market (demand for land from the three industries equals the exogenously given land
endowment) and equation (27) ensures the feasibility of the equilibrium level of organic
production. The eight equilibrium conditions (21)-(28) yield the post-innovation equilibrium
values of the eight endogenous variables * * * * * * * *( , , , , , , , )b n g b n gx x x p p p z  . The pre-innovation
equilibrium is a special case, obtained by dropping equations (23) and (26), by setting
0n bs s t   , and by constraining the price of the new product to gp (the choke price, that is,
14 For example, the fact that the EU organic food classification envisions zero tolerance of GM product (as
is also the case in the United States) can be interpreted as increasing the value of bs .
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the price that would drive GM food demand to zero). The resulting conditions can then be solved
for the pre-innovation equilibrium values * * * * * *( , , , , , )b n b nx x p p z  .15
4. Data and calibration
We present the data on the parameters of the model in Table 1, which refers to the year 2000.
Data for the total EU UAA are obtained from the EU Directorate General for Agriculture (2003).
The land utilized by the quality products (mostly represented by organic food), which is denoted
by bL , amounts to 2.9% of the total EU UAA (Hamm, Gronefeld, and Halpin, 2002). The rest of
the total EU UAA is assumed to be allocated to normal food production, which is denoted by nL .
The value of total agricultural production is obtained from the report of the EU Directorate
General for Agriculture (2003). The value of organic food production is calculated based on data
reported by Hamm, Gronefeld, and Halpin (2002). The difference between the values of total and
organic food production is accounted as the value of conventional food production. The price of
conventional food is normalized to 1, so that the amount of conventional food production is the
value of conventional food production. The yield for the conventional product is then calculated
by dividing the estimated production in volume by the estimated land used for the conventional
product.
The price index for organic products that we have computed displays the price premium of such
products over the conventional ones (the price of which was normalized to 1). Using this
premium, the amount of organic food production is obtained by dividing the value of organic
food with its price index. The yield for organic food production is calculated by dividing the
amount of organic food production by the amount of land used in that industry. Using the data on
average rent per hectare and the amount of agricultural land for each country in the EU (EU
Directorate General for Agriculture, 2003), the rent attributable to total utilized land was
calculated to be 11% of the total value of agriculture in the EU. The value of (unit rent) is then
obtained by dividing total rent by the total amount of land. Then, the average production cost for
conventional food ( c ) was calculated as the difference between the price of conventional food
and rent expense per unit of conventional food, as formulated in equation (21) (with 0ns  ).
15 Again, note that we are assuming competitive conditions, apart from the possible market power in the
pricing of GM seeds that is implicit in our model (as noted in footnote 13). A reviewer suggested that
possible market power in the food and retail industries should also be considered. But given the focus of
this paper, such an undertaking is best left for future research.
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Table 1. Parameters Implemented in the Baseline
Description Unit Values
Primary Data
TV Total value of production b€ 248.5
bV Value of organic food production b€ 2.79
L Total UAA in the EU mha 130.3
bL Land allocated to organic food mha 3.78
 Unit land rent €/ha 208.8
Calculated
np Price of normal food (price index) €/u 1.00
bp Price of organic food (price index) €/u 1.63
n T bV V V  Value of normal food production b€ 245.7
n nx V Normal food production bu 245.7
n bL L L  Land allocated to normal food mha 126.6
n n nL x  Reciprocal of yield, normal food u/ha 1,941
b b bx V p Organic food production bu 1.71
b b bL x  Reciprocal of yield, organic food u/ha 452
n nc p   Unit cost of market input bundle €/u 0.89
/bz L L Fraction of land allocated to organic 0.029
Assumed and
calibrated
ns Segregation cost for normal food €/u 0.05
bs Segregation cost for organic food €/u 0.05
 GM product efficiency parameter 0.98
t Unit labelling and traceability cost €/u 0
 Share of indifferent consumers 0.25
 Total demand elasticity 0.40
 Organic production parameter 10.65
Legend: € = euros, b = billion, ha = hectare, m = million, u = unit of production
(index number).
The economics of IP and segregation for different commodities and markets has been studied in
recent years (Buckwell, Brookes, and Bradley, 1999), and some preliminary estimates of likely
segregation costs are available. In particular, the study by the European Commission (2002)
analyzing possible co-existence scenarios suggests IP costs in the ranges of 4.5% and 9.5% for
maize and 1.4% and 3.2% for potatoes (to meet a 1% threshold level). Desquilbet and Bullock
(2001) considered the segregation costs at the farm and handling stages to be 4% of the farm
price and 20% of the handler’s mark-up at maximum. Sobolevsky, Moschini, and Lapan (2005)
rely on Lin, Chambers, and Harwood (2000) and use segregation costs between 3.4% and 10.3%
of the average US producers’ price for soybeans. Based on the foregoing, in this study we took 
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the segregation cost to be 5% of the selling price in the baseline solution. Therefore, because the
pre-innovation price of conventional food is normalized to equal 1, the unit segregation costs ns
and bs for conventional and organic products, respectively, are set to 0.05 euros in the baseline
scenario.
There seems to be widespread agreement that GM crops can provide substantial efficiency gains
relative to their conventional counterparts, although there is less agreement on the magnitude of
such gains (e.g., Moschini, Lapan, and Sobolevsky, 2000; Bullock and Nitsi, 2001; Marra,
Pardey, and Alston, 2002; Qaim and Zilberman, 2003; Qaim and Traxler, 2005). To be broadly
consistent with such studies, here we make the (perhaps conservative) assumption that the
introduction of GM technology yields a 2% reduction in average cost of GM food production. But
note that, as discussed in footnote 13, this figure is to be interpreted as representing the farm-level
cost saving net of the price mark-up typically associated with GM seeds (as implied by the market
power due to the proprietary nature of GM technology). Thus, in our baseline model we set
0.98 .
Labelling and traceability costs are implemented in the model by the parameter t . In the baseline
solution we assume 0t  but consider alternatives at the sensitivity analysis stage. Finally, the
parameter representing the percentage of consumers who are indifferent between GM and
conventional food versions (when the two varieties are offered at the same price) is taken to be
0.25 based on the survey results (Moon and Balasubramanian, 2001) and experimental
findings (Noussair, Robin, and Ruffieux, 2004). As noted earlier, without loss of generality we
assume that those indifferent consumers will purchase GM food (any other allocation of
indifferent consumers could be implemented by changing the value of ).
Given the above, what remains is to calibrate the demand parameters ( 0 , 0 , and 0 )
and the production parameter 0 . We do so by ensuring that, given the other assumptions
detailed in the foregoing, the chosen parameters allow the model to replicate the observed prices
and quantities for the benchmark year 2000. Specifically, in the pre-innovation competitive
equilibrium ( 0bs  ), by using the data presented in Table 1 and given the unit rent 208.8
computed as described earlier, from equation (21) (with 0ns  ) the production cost parameter c
must satisfy ( ) 208.8n np c   . Next, given 208.8 and 0.029z (obtained as the fraction
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of land allocated to organic production), from equation (22) of the pre-innovation equilibrium we
solve for 10.653 .
To calibrate the demand parameters involves making assumptions about the parameters ( , ,)
such that the benchmark prices and quantities are replicated, in addition to satisfying likely values
of the demand elasticities involved. A possible difficulty in this context is that the parameters
govern not only the own-price elasticities but also the cross-price elasticities (including
elasticities of demand for GM food, a product that was not yet on the market in the benchmark
year). But our specification is particularly useful here, because we can deduce the behaviour of
the demand system from the value of a total elasticity that refers to aggregate food demand. To
see this, define total demand as:
( , , ) ( , , ) ( , , ) ( , , )T b n gb n g b n g b n g b n gD p p p D p p p D p p p D p p p   (29)
Given this, we define the total demand elasticity as
1
( , , )
( , , )
T
b n g
T T
b n g
D p p p
D p p p

   
   




(30)
It can be verified that in our demand structure we have T  . Thus, the parameter  is a
measure of the elasticity of total food demand, which is known to be quite inelastic in developed
countries (Moschini, 1998; Gracia, Gil, and Angulo, 1998; Tiffin and Tiffin, 1999). But here we
also need to consider that in our model the demand is for EU-produced food (i.e., net of import
and exports), and thus it is likely more elastic than the final EU demand for food. Given this
likelihood, in the baseline solution we assume 0.4 . Conditional on these elasticity values, the
market clearing conditions in equations (24)-(25) (with the price of GM product set to the choke
level gp ) are solved for the remaining two demand parameters, by using the demand functions
from equations (14) and (15), to yield 238.7k  (billion) and 0.989 .
5. Results
Given our calibration procedure, solving the model for the pre-innovation equilibrium replicates
observed price and quantity levels for the year 2000. Solving the model for the post-innovation
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equilibrium allows us to trace the main economic implications of the adoption of GM products.
The economic effects that we focus on relate to the direction of price changes for traditional,
organic, and GM products and the distribution of welfare effects across agents (consumers and
producers). Specifically, in our model there are three welfare effects of interest. First, consumers
are affected by the innovation, and thus we wish to compute the change in aggregate consumer
surplus, CS . Agricultural producers’ welfare is also affected by the innovation. In particular,
our model admits two distinct components of what is usually referred to as producer surplus
change, PS : a change in the return to land and a change in the return to efforts for producers of
organic product.
Consider first consumer welfare. Denote the pre-innovation and post-innovation equilibrium
solutions with superscripts 0i and 1i , respectively, such that the pre- and post-equilibrium
prices are written as 0 0 0, , )( n b gp p p and
1 1 1
, , )( n b gp p p . It follows that the change in total consumer
surplus is
11 1
0 0 0
0 0 1 0 1 1( , , ) ( , , ) ( ; , )
gb n
b n g
pp p
b b n g b n b n g n g b n g g
p p p
CS D p p p dp D p p p dp D p p p dp      (31)
As for producer surplus, as mentioned earlier, our model admits two distinct components.
Consider the return to efforts for organic food producers, labelled as ibR , {0,1}i . Then in our
model these returns satisfy
2
0
( )
[ ( )]
2
iz i
i i i
b b b
b b
L z L c
R p MC z dz

 
   (32)
where ( ) (1 )i i i ib b bMC z z c s     . The other component of producer surplus is the return to
landowners at equilibria {0,1}i , which satisfies i iLV L . Hence, the change in surplus
accruing to landowners is 1 0( )LV L    and the change in surplus accruing to organic food
producers is 1 0b b bR R R   , such that the total change in producer surplus is b LPS R V   .
Finally, total welfare change arising from the innovation is measured as W CS PS   .
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5.1. Baseline scenario
In the base scenario the model was solved with the calibrated parameters reported in Table 1.
Note that the cost for labelling and traceability of GM food (over and above the cost of IP) here is
set equal to zero (i.e., 0t  ). Although there are likely minimal costs involved in labelling GM
food per se, the record-keeping mandated by the traceability requirements on GM food are likely
more onerous. Still, the benchmark of zero labelling and traceability costs is of some interest,
especially if one wants to disentangle the effects of such activities from the actual segregation
costs necessary to supply consumers with what they perceive as the superior products
(conventional and organic food with IP), and therefore we begin our analysis with that
assumption. We perform sensitivity analysis regarding this parameter value later. The other
critical parameter is the segregation cost. In the baseline scenario we assume that conventional
food and organic food face the same segregation costs, following the introduction of GM
products, and thus (as per earlier discussion) we set 0.05n bs s  .
Results for the base scenario are reported in Table 2. With the introduction of GM food, the price
of GM food declines relative to the pre-innovation choke price (recall that there is no demand for
GM food for all g np p ), and this new product displaces mainly the conventional product (the
production of which decreases by 30.7 %). To interpret these and subsequent results it helps to
note explicitly that the difference in equilibrium prices between conventional and GM products is
determined by the supply side of the model, specifically, * * (1 )n g np p c s t     . Given this
price difference, in turn, the demand side determines the relative share of GM and non-GM
products on the market. Absent segregation costs, the introduction of a more efficient production
(the GM product) would tend to increase the returns to land (the unit rent ). But the existence
of segregation costs puts a wedge between the demand prices and supply prices for the
conventional and organic products and leads to a sizeable erosion to the returns to land (the fixed
factor). At the demand level, the price of GM food of course decreases relative to the pre-
innovation choke price level. The price of organic food decreases at the demand level (despite the
need for segregation) because the production-cost impact of the decline in the rental price of land
is more important for this (land-extensive) sector. The price of conventional food, on the other
hand, increases at the demand level (because the effect of segregation costs, which act like a tax,
dominates).
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Table 2. Baseline Scenario Results
Values Variation
Variable Unit Preinnovation
Post
innovation Level %
Demand prices
normal food ( np ) €/u 1.00 1.026 0.026 2.55
organic food ( bp ) €/u 1.63 1.584 -0.046 -2.83
GM food ( gp ) €/u >1.00 0.958 -0.055 -5.44
Producer prices
normal food ( n np s ) €/u 1.00 0.976 -0.024 -2.45
organic food ( b bp s ) €/u 1.63 1.534 -0.096 -5.90
GM food ( gp t ) €/u >1.00 0.958 -0.055 -5.44
Food production
normal food ( nx ) bu 245.71 170.31 -75.41 -30.69
organic food ( bx ) bu 1.71 1.77 0.06 3.30
GM food ( gx ) bu 0.00 75.17 75.17 —
Total segregation costs b€ 0.00 8.60 8.60 —
Unit land rent () €/ha 208.79 161.24 -47.55 -22.78
Total return to land b€ 27.21 21.02 -6.20 -22.78
Profit of organic producers m€ 235.57 251.35 15.78 6.70
Producer surplus b€ 27.45 21.27 -6.18 -22.52
Consumer surplus b€ — — -1.55 —
Aggregate welfare b€ — — -7.73 —
Note: see Table 1 for the definition of units of measurement.
All producer prices decrease in the new equilibrium (which in turn accounts for the decrease in
unit rent value of land). As for welfare effects, returns to land of course decline, but the non-land
returns to organic food producers increase. Overall, however, the returns to land obviously
dominate, and producer surplus declines substantially. Consumer surplus also declines: given our
parameterized preferences, the decline in the price of GM and organic food is not enough to
compensate for the increase in conventional food price. Because both producers and consumers
lose in the aggregate, the introduction of GM food in the EU agro-food system unambiguously
decreases the total welfare by 7.7 billion euros. We should emphasize again that, unlike other
studies in this area, in our calculation we do not account for the ex post returns to innovators that
develop the GM crops.16
16 One way to rationalize our procedure is to consider ex post returns to innovators as compensating, in
expectation, for the R&D investments that made the innovation possible.
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To further illustrate and qualify the foregoing results of the baseline scenarios, in what follows we
carry out a sensitivity analysis, whereby the effects of changes in the value of some key
parameters are explored.17
5.2. Effects of segregation cost for organic food
In the baseline solution we postulated that segregation costs for conventional and organic food are
equal, that is, n bs s . But it is of interest to analyze the effects of two alternative polar
situations. The first situation is the case that b ns s . A justification for this scenario derives from
the observation that organic products derive from well-specified production practices that
inherently already include elements of IP. Thus, one can hypothesize that there may be a smaller
segregation cost for organic products, relative to conventional products, following the
introduction of GM food. But the alternative of b ns s is also quite relevant, because organic
production insists on a zero-tolerance level for the adventitious presence of GM material. Meeting
this stricter standard is, of course, bound to be costlier.
The results concerning the impact of segregation costs are reported in Table 3. The first column,
in particular, computes the impact of the innovation if in fact all such costs were absent. This
(unrealistic) scenario is useful as a benchmark. Note in particular that both producers and
consumers overall would benefit from the GM innovation, so aggregate welfare increases. But the
returns to organic producers would decrease in such a scenario because of the double impact of
competition at the demand level (one more substitute product is available) and because of the
increase in the returns to land (which causes production costs to increase for the organic industry
proportionally more than in the other industries).
To ascertain the potential impact of alternative scenarios for the cost of segregating organic food,
the parameter bs is halved and doubled, respectively, while all other parameters are kept at their
baseline values. The results reported in Table 3 show that a lower segregation cost for organic
food leads to a lower equilibrium price for organic food, as expected, whereas the equilibrium
prices of other goods increase. The effect on the equilibrium quantity demanded is for organic
food to increase (relative to the benchmark) and for the other two products to decrease, although
the magnitude of these effects is somewhat small. Per-hectare rent remains higher than at the
17 In addition to what is reported in Tables 3 to 5, we also performed sensitivity analysis on the value of
the demand elasticity . Although omitted here for space reasons, we can note that such sensitivity
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baseline, which increases the cost of production so that prices for conventional and GM food are
higher compared to the baseline. Both components of producer surplus increase relative to the
baseline, whereas consumer surplus is actually lower than at the baseline (the additional decrease
in organic food price does not offset the small price increases in the other two products). Overall,
aggregate welfare is minimally improved (relative to the baseline). Doubling bs has essentially
the opposite effect of halving it, and therefore the economic effects are qualitatively reversed
relative to the baseline.
Table 3. Sensitivity Analysis on Segregation Costs
Segregation costs
Variable 0bs 
0ns 
bs B
ns B
2bs B
ns B
2bs B
ns B
2bs B
2ns B
2bs B
2ns B
Consumer prices
normal food ( np ) 1.0044 1.0255 1.0262 1.0241 1.0141 1.0530
organic food ( bp ) 1.6460 1.5839 1.5655 1.6211 1.6117 1.5463
GM food ( gp ) 0.9865 0.9577 0.9584 0.9563 0.9713 0.9352
Producer prices
normal ( n np s ) 1.0044 0.9755 0.9762 0.9741 0.9891 0.9530
organic ( b bp s ) 1.6460 1.5339 1.5405 1.5211 1.5867 1.4463
GM food ( gp t ) 0.9865 0.9577 0.9584 0.9563 0.9713 0.9352
Food production
normal food ( nx ) 180.70 170.31 170.25 170.41 175.48 160.20
organic food ( bx ) 1.69 1.77 1.79 1.72 1.73 1.82
GM food ( gx ) 65.08 75.17 75.13 75.24 70.14 85.04
Segregation costs 0.00 8.60 8.56 8.69 4.43 16.20
Unit land rent () 217.26 161.24 162.65 158.52 187.64 117.64
Total return to land 28.32 21.02 21.20 20.66 24.46 15.33
Profit of organic
producers 230.97 251.35 257.48 239.61 241.65 267.15
Producer surplus 28.55 21.27 21.46 20.90 24.70 15.60
Variation in
consumer surplus 0.03 -1.55 -1.69 -1.27 -0.61 -4.23
Variation in
aggregate welfare 1.13 -7.73 -7.69 -7.82 -3.37 -16.08
Legend: B = base value (see Table 1). See Table 2 for the units of measurement and for
the pre-innovation solution.
analysis results remain qualitatively similar to those of the baseline scenario.
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5.3. Effects of the overall level of segregation costs
As discussed earlier, a wide range of segregation costs have been contemplated in previous
studies, and much uncertainty remains as to their actual level because large-scale segregation of
GM and non-GM products has not yet been attempted. The parameter value for segregation cost
used in the baseline reflects an average of values found in previous studies, but clearly it is of
interest to evaluate the model’s sensitivity to changes in the level of segregation cost. To that end, 
here we maintain the baseline’s assumption that segregation costs for organic and conventional
products are the same ( n bs s ), and consider the effects of doubling and halving their level. The
results are reported in the last two columns of Table 3.
None of the results qualitatively changes relative to the pre-innovation scenario. For higher
segregation costs, the equilibrium producers’ prices are uniformly lower than at the baseline; at 
the demand level the only price that increases (relative to the baseline) is that of conventional
food (the largest industry here). The production of organic food and of GM food both expand,
whereas the production of conventional food decreases relative to the baseline. The gain to
consumers due to the decrease in the prices of GM and organic food does not outweigh their
losses due to the increase in the price of conventional food, and consumers are (as expected)
negatively impacted by the larger segregation costs. Organic food producers’ returns increase, as 
does their supply, but overall the higher segregation costs hurt producers, consumers, and
aggregate welfare. Halving the segregation costs works just the opposite of doubling them, so the
results are qualitatively reversed relative to the baseline case. In particular, both GM and organic
food production decrease (relative to the baseline). Overall welfare is improved but organic
producers actually prefer uniformly higher segregation costs.
5.4. Effects of GM labelling and traceability costs
Labelling and traceability of GM food envisioned by the current EU regulation, as discussed
earlier, clearly increase the costs of marketing GM products while they arguably do not affect the
IP costs of non-GM products (which still have to undertake all the many IP activities that are
required to ensure segregation at the desired purity level). In the baseline, we set the labelling and
traceability costs to zero in order to disentangle their effects from those of segregation costs,
which are necessary to preserve the identity of conventional and organic food. We now do
sensitivity analysis by allowing this parameter to take positive values, specifically one-fourth and
one-half of the segregation cost for conventional food (set at its baseline value). The results are
presented in Table 4.
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Table 4. Sensitivity Analysis on Labelling and Traceability Costs
Baseline Labelling and
traceability costs
Variable 0t 4nt s 2nt s
Consumer prices
normal food ( np ) 1.0255 1.0208 1.0165
organic food ( bp ) 1.5839 1.5666 1.5509
GM food ( gp ) 0.9577 0.9654 0.9736
Producer prices
normal food ( n np s ) 0.9755 0.9708 0.9665
organic food ( b bp s ) 1.5339 1.5166 1.5009
GM food ( gp t ) 0.9577 0.9529 0.9486
Food production
normal food ( nx ) 170.31 172.80 175.29
organic food ( bx ) 1.77 1.78 1.80
GM food ( gx ) 75.17 72.60 70.03
Segregation and labelling costs 8.60 9.64 10.61
Unit land rent () 161.24 152.07 143.71
Total return to land 21.02 19.82 18.73
Profit of organic producers 251.35 256.61 261.59
Producer surplus 21.27 20.08 18.99
Variation in consumers surplus -1.55 -1.28 -1.09
Variation in aggregate welfare -7.73 -8.66 -9.55
Notes: See Table 2 for units of measurement and for the pre-innovation
solution. Parameter sn set at baseline value of 0.05.
The positive labelling and traceability costs, over and above segregation costs, have a direct
negative impact on the supply price of GM food, which in turn tends to decrease the returns to
land. The latter affects the unit production costs so that in equilibrium the demand prices of
conventional and organic food are also lower (but the price of GM food is higher owing to the
tax-like effect of the GM labelling and traceability requirements). The returns to producers of
quality food are improved by labelling and traceability costs imposed on GM producers,
compared to the baseline. But the organic industry is small, and for the overall producer surplus
the further drop in the returns to land tends to dominate. Consumer surplus is actually improved
by positive labelling and traceability costs, because consumers can enjoy the lower equilibrium
prices of conventional and organic products. Overall aggregate welfare, however, is negatively
impacted (producers lose more than consumers gain).
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5.5. Effects of the size of GM innovation
The parameter for cost reduction due to GM technology indexes the farmers’ net benefit from 
adopting GM innovation. The value 0.98 used in the baseline is an educated guess based on
the values suggested in the literature. Our sensitivity analysis of this parameter considered
0.99 and 0.97 . The results (reported in the Appendix, along with the sensitivity analysis
of the parameter ) show that the size of the GM innovation does not change the qualitative
insights obtained in the baseline. For a lower value of the parameter, the cost reduction from
GM innovation becomes higher and GM production slightly expands. The opposite attains for the
higher value of the parameter. The qualitative effects on prices are intuitive. As for welfare, a
larger GM innovation improves overall welfare and returns to land, relative to the baseline, but
decreases consumer surplus and the returns to organic producers.
5.6. Effects of the size of the population of indifferent consumers
Our baseline parameter 0.25 assumes that 25% of EU consumers are, essentially, indifferent
to the GM nature of food produced from GM crops; as long as in equilibrium the new product
commands a lower price (no matter how small the difference), these consumers would consume
the new product. As discussed earlier, this parameterization captures an important attribute of the
demand impact of the introduction of the new, weakly inferior GM products. But how important
is the actual size of the parameter  for our conclusions? Table 5 provides some sensitivity
analysis that considers various alternative values for this parameter.
The case of 1 considers a scenario in which all consumers are indifferent between GM and
conventional food. In such a case the GM food completely supplants the pre-existing non-GM
conventional food. This scenario would be associated with an increase in the returns to land
(which captures most of the efficiency gains of the innovation), but consumers also gain and there
is a sizeable overall welfare gain. The losers in such a setting would be the organic food
producers, for three reasons: because the increased returns to land increase their production costs;
because the competing product at the demand level is available at a slightly lower price; and
because they still have to incur segregation costs to market their non-GM organic product to
consumers. Decreasing the parameter  (i.e., more and more consumers dislike the GM
innovation) decreases overall welfare, returns to land, and consumer surplus. But organic
producers prefer a lower because that means that consumers are more attracted to their product
(ceteris paribus) and because they can benefit from the reduced rental price of land.
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Table 5. Sensitivity Analysis on the Population of Indifferent Consumers
Baseline Size of population of indifferent consumers
Variable 0.25 0.125 0.5 0.75 1
Consumer prices
normal food ( np ) 1.0255 1.0189 1.0387 1.0517 1.0646
organic food ( bp ) 1.5839 1.5600 1.6316 1.6793 1.7268
GM food ( gp ) 0.9577 0.9510 0.9708 0.9838 0.9967
Producer prices
normal food ( n np s ) 0.9755 0.9689 0.9887 1.0017 1.0146
organic food ( b bp s ) 1.5339 1.5100 1.5816 1.6293 1.6768
GM food ( gp t ) 0.9577 0.9510 0.9708 0.9838 0.9967
Food production
normal food ( nx ) 170.31 199.10 113.07 56.31 0.00
organic food ( bx ) 1.77 1.79 1.71 1.66 1.61
GM food ( gx ) 75.17 46.25 132.63 189.62 246.14
Total segregation costs 8.60 10.04 5.74 2.90 0.08
Unit land rent () 161.24 148.36 186.79 212.08 237.12
Total return to land 21.02 19.34 24.35 27.64 30.91
Profit of organic producers 251.35 259.54 236.05 222.06 209.25
Producer surplus 21.27 19.60 24.58 27.86 31.11
Variation in
consumer surplus -1.55 -1.90 -0.83 -0.10 0.64
Variation in
aggregate welfare -7.73 -9.75 -3.70 0.31 4.31
Note: See Table 1 and Table 2 for the units of measurement, baseline values of
parameters, and for the pre-innovation solution.
5.7. Some break-even points
To sharpen the model’s prediction on the potential quantitative impacts of GM product adoption 
on EU agriculture and welfare, the computation of “break-even” points, which we report in Table 
6, may be useful (Demont, Wesseler, and Tollens, 2004). Consider first the size of the innovation
captured by the parameter . As is apparent by now, our model displays one of the insights
formalized in Lapan and Moschini (2004): there is a possible market failure associated with the
mere introduction of the new product that can have a negative impact on welfare. Indeed, our
baseline solution indicates that overall welfare in the EU would drop as a result of GM crop
adoption, mostly because of the need for (hitherto unnecessary) segregation costs.
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But, as the foregoing analysis indicates, the marginal impact of the innovation may be positive
(because the externality effect is associated with the presence of the new GM activity, and not to
its level, the possible market failure is essentially due to a nonconvexity). So, is there a size of the
innovation large enough to fully offset the aggregate negative welfare effects of the GM
innovation? The answer is yes, in our model. But, as Table 6 indicates, the parameter would
have to be extraordinarily low: 0.8774 . That is, GM crop production would need to entail an
efficiency gain exceeding 12%. Even at that, however, the break-even of aggregate welfare would
be achieved at the expense of consumers and of organic food producers (both of these groups
would lose).
Next, we consider the impact of segregation costs. How low would they need to be, given our
other baseline parameters, for aggregate welfare not to decrease? Very low indeed, in our model,
Table 6. Break-Even Analysis
Break-even value of given parameter
(all other parameters held at baseline value)
Variable
Baseline
0.8774 =0.0062b ns s 0.7305
Consumer prices
normal food ( np ) 1.0255 1.0723 1.0066 1.0507
organic food ( bp ) 1.5839 1.7592 1.6369 1.6755
GM food ( gp ) 0.9577 0.9130 0.9826 0.9828
Producer prices
normal food ( n np s ) 0.9755 1.0223 1.0004 1.0007
organic food ( b bp s ) 1.5339 1.7092 1.6307 1.6255
GM food ( gp t ) 0.9577 0.9130 0.9826 0.9828
Food production
normal food ( nx ) 170.31 152.58 179.40 60.72
organic food ( bx ) 1.77 1.60 1.70 1.66
GM food ( gx ) 75.17 93.58 66.34 185.19
Total segregation costs 8.60 7.71 1.13 3.12
Unit land rent () 161.24 252.18 209.59 210.12
Total return to land 21.02 32.87 27.32 27.39
Profit of organic producers 251.35 207.77 233.70 223.11
Producer surplus 21.27 33.08 27.55 27.61
Variation in consumer surplus -1.55 -5.63 -0.10 -0.16
Variation in aggregate welfare -7.73 0.00 0.00 0.00
Note: See Table 1 and Table 2 for the units of measurement, baseline values of
parameters, and for the pre-innovation solution.
28
as indicated in Table 6. Specifically, we would need =0.0062b ns s ; i.e., segregation costs
would need to account for less than 1% of the supply price. Finally, for the break-even point of
the parameter indexing the size of the population of indifferent consumers we find 0.73 . This
is much higher than our (conservative) baseline choice but perhaps not outside of the set of likely
values. The truth of the matter is that little is known about the quantitative attributes of consumer
response to GM attributes in food. Our analysis here again emphasizes the crucial effect such
preferences have on the calculation of possible market and welfare effects.
6. Conclusion
We have developed a partial equilibrium, multi-market model of the European agricultural sector,
in which conventional food and organic food both exist prior to the introduction of GM products
and may be differentially affected by this innovation. Whereas the model is rather stylized, it
possesses some distinctive features: on the demand side, consumers have differentiated tastes
with respect to these three products; on the supply side, we explicitly take into account the IP
costs that GM food would impose on other goods in the equilibrium. For organic food, we model
quality enhancement as resulting from additional efforts supplied by producers. We endogenise
the reward to these efforts and the price of land. The calibrated model is solved for equilibrium
prices, quantities, and welfare changes, and these simulation results are supplemented by some
sensitivity analysis.
The results show that the introduction of GM products in this context reduces welfare, as well as
both consumers’ and producers’ surplus. This conclusion differs from those of existing empirical
studies, which have found a positive welfare impact of the new GM technology (e.g., Moschini,
Lapan, and Sobolevsky, 2000; Falck-Zepeda, Traxler, and Nelson, 2000; Demont and Tollens,
2004), but it is in keeping with the analyses of Lapan and Moschini (2004), Fulton and Giannakas
(2004), and Sobolevsky, Moschini, and Lapan (2005). There are at least four reasons for that.
First, here we explicitly allow for differentiated consumer preferences, specifically for some
consumers to have a preference for non-GM products. Second, in this model we have also
assumed that it is costlier to provide non-GM products in the post-GM situation because of the
need for IP activities. Both of these features, ignored by the aforementioned studies, appear quite
relevant, and their explicit consideration should improve our assessment of the economic impact
of the new GM technology. Third, in this study we have also neglected the ex post returns to the
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providers of the GM innovation, for reasons discussed earlier.18 Finally, our analysis explicitly
models the multi-market effects of GM adoption and specifically accounts for the endogeneity of
the returns to agriculture’s foremost fixed input, land. 
An important attribute of the GM product innovation effects highlighted by our model is the
distinction between the total and marginal impact of GM innovation adoption. Such a distinction
derives from the fact that we have modelled a market failure associated with the per se
introduction of the (otherwise efficiency-enhancing) innovation. Introducing GM products entails
some drastic adjustments for the agricultural sector, and hitherto unnecessary segregation
activities (a real resource cost) are now necessary, which tends to decrease aggregate welfare. But
given that GM products are introduced, ceteris paribus it may be desirable to have a larger rather
than smaller diffusion of the product. For instance, the labelling and traceability requirements of
GM products, which act as a disincentive to the (marginal) adoption of GM products, here further
decrease aggregate welfare.
Another conclusion of our analysis is that the introduction of GM products actually benefits the
producers of organic food. Such a conclusion, of course, is bound to depend on possible
differences in segregation costs for the two non-GM products. Insisting on a zero tolerance level
for the adventitious presence of GM content in organic food, for example, presumably requires
costlier segregation activities, and that will hurt organic producers. We also show that the new
EU labelling and traceability requirements do decrease the market share of GM food and hurt the
overall returns to farmers but actually have a slightly positive impact on the welfare of consumers
(production costs decrease because of lower land rents).
One of the main contributions of this article is the derivation of a model that allows for a
differentiated food demand, induced by the innovation itself, and to show that such a
differentiated demand structure can be embedded in a standard equilibrium model of the
agricultural sector that is suitable for welfare analysis. The new GM product can be thought of as
existing before the innovation but with zero production because it is too costly (given demand).
18 If we were interested in evaluating the ex post welfare effects of a given (available) innovation, it would
possibly be desirable to account for such returns to the providers of the innovation, and that could
clearly change the overall welfare picture. On the other hand, if the focus is on EU welfare, a relevant
observation is that the current GM traits are mostly owned by companies located outside the EU. Indeed,
some have suggested this fact may provide an important political-economy explanation for the
dramatically different treatment so far accorded to these products in the United States and the EU (Graff
and Zilberman, 2004).
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Innovation reduces the unit production cost for the new product below the choke price and results
in positive production of the GM product. Given the competitive structure of the model and
without additional effects, such an efficiency-enhancing innovation would increase aggregate
welfare. Indeed, we verify that eventuality in the benchmark reported in the first column of Table
3. But, in our setting, the introduction of the new GM product brings about the need for
segregation of non-GM products. As noted by Moschini and Lapan (2005), this external effect
essentially induces a nonconvexity in the aggregate production set. (The link between
externalities and nonconvexities is well known; see, e.g., Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green, 1995,
chapter 11.) Because of this nonconvexity, the conditions for the first welfare theorem fail, and
we can no longer presume that the competitive equilibrium achieves a first-best outcome. In fact,
the results reported in this article illustrate the potential for welfare to decrease because of the
innovation. While qualitatively interesting, the actual magnitude of the market and welfare
impacts uncovered obviously depends on the necessarily simplified structure of the model and on
the parametric calibration that was implemented. The sensitivity analysis carried out provides
some comfort as to the robustness of the results presented, but much scope remains for future
work devoted to a more exact accounting of the many (sometimes unexpected) impacts that
modern biotechnology is having on the agricultural sector.
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Appendix. Additional Sensitivity Analysis: Parameter of Cost Reduction
Due to GM Technology () and Total Elasticity Value ()
Baseline Post innovation
Variable
0.4
0.98
0.4
0.97
0.4
0.99
0.2
0.98
0.8
0.98
Consumer prices
normal food ( np ) 1.0255 1.0291 1.0221 1.0304 1.0229
organic food ( bp ) 1.5839 1.5972 1.5714 1.6031 1.5738
GM food ( gp ) 0.9577 0.9524 0.9632 0.9626 0.9551
Producer prices
normal food ( n np s ) 0.9755 0.9791 0.9721 0.9804 0.9729
organic food ( b bp s ) 1.5339 1.5472 1.5214 1.5531 1.5238
GM food ( gp t ) 0.9577 0.9524 0.9632 0.9626 0.9551
Food production
normal food ( nx ) 170.31 168.54 172.08 171.05 168.95
organic food ( bx ) 1.77 1.75 1.78 1.75 1.77
GM food ( gx ) 75.17 77.00 73.33 74.47 76.50
Total segregation costs 8.60 8.51 8.69 8.64 8.54
Unit land rent () 161.24 168.27 154.61 170.78 156.22
Total return to land 21.02 21.93 20.15 22.26 20.36
Profit of organic producers 251.35 247.45 255.13 247.98 253.05
Producer surplus 21.27 22.18 20.41 22.51 20.62
Variation in
consumer surplus -1.55 -1.78 -1.35 -2.81 -0.85
Variation in
aggregate welfare -7.73 -7.05 -8.39 -7.76 -7.69
Note: See Table 1 and Table 2 for the units of measurement, baseline values of
parameters, and for the pre-innovation solution.
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